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ABSTRACT 
Most empirical investigations of electric utility behavior use 
the realized rate of return as a proxy for the allowed rate of return, 
We examine the validity of this assumption and investigate the 
relationship of the allowed and realized rates to the cost of capital 
between 1973 and 1982, We use two measures of the cost of capital: 
one based on returns to book equity, the other derived from a market 
price of equity. While realized and allowed rates were generally 
higher than the book measure throughout the period, both of the rates 
of return were less than the market price of capital after 1979. We 
also find firms did not earn their allowed rate of return after 1974. 
Therefore, the use of the realized rate as a proxy for the allowed 
rate in emprioal models will lead to biased parameter estimates. To 
help correct this bias, we give data for allowed rates. 
A NOTE ON ALLOWED AND REALIZED RATES OF RETURN 
IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY• 
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Over two decades after Averch and Johnson published their 1962 
article, their thesis is still a source of controversy in economics, 
Since 1974, it has undergone extensive empirical testing. These tests 
differ in model specif �pation, econometric methods, sample size, and 
results, However, almost all the tests have used the realized rate of 
return on the rate base as a proxy for the allowed rate of return 
under the assumption that the allowed and realized rates are equal in 
equilibrium. The single period forms of the model require the allowed 
rate of return to be at least as great as the cost of capital, We 
examine the validity of these assumptions. We find (1) the allowed 
• We would like to thank Theodore Keeler, Jeffrey Dubin, and Leland 
Johnson for their valuable comments and support, However, this paper 
reflects our own views and errors, 
and realized rates were greater than the cost of capital until the 
late 1970s and (2) the realized rate of return was less than the 
allowed rate of return after 1974. 
1, THE COST OF CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN 
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There are thirteen regimes defined by the relations among the 
allowed rate of return (s), the realized rate of return (z), and the 
cost of capital (r). We portray these in Table 1. One can 
distinguish the regimes by their satisfaction of two assumptions: (1) 
The firm must earn its cost of capital, or exit the market in the long 
run (the financial constraint), i, e, , z) r, (2) The firm earns no 
more than its allowed rate of return (the regulatory constraint), 
i,e, , s) z, These assumptions imply: (3) The allowed rate of return 
is at least as great as the cost of capital, i. e. , s 2 r, As one can 
see in Table 1, most regimes are not admissible under the traditional 
form of the Averch-Johnson model, Any regime consistent with all 
three assumptions must satisfy s 2 z 2 r, 
Most empirical tests of the model assume that s = z > r holds 
for the average firm. As Smithson (1978), p. 569, states, the 
substitution of the realized rate for the allowed rate, where the 
allowed rate is greater than the realized rate, results in a biased 
estimate of overcapitalization. 1 Some authors have been sensitive to 
this issue, Spann (1974) controls his sample period to assure the 
firms are in equilibrium. Gollop and Karlson (1980) note the equality 
of allowed and realized rates is an important assumption, but they do 
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not need to restrict their dynamic model to regimes where s � z � 
Therefore, to test the Averch-Johnson model, one must first show 
2 
s 2 z 2 r, We test this by examining these variables from 1973 to 
1982. 
2, DIFFERENCES AMONG RATES 
To conduct these tests, we must define the cost of capital, 
r. 
We use two measures: one based on regulatory practices and the other 
from financial theory, The first is a weighted average cost of 
capital, c, derived from the capital asset pricing model's definition 
of the market price of equity, The second is the Allowance for Funds 
Used During Construction (AFUDC) rate, a, calculated from realized 
rates of return on the book value of equity. It is the rate at which 
firms are allowed to capitalize construction expenditures. We 
describe both measures in the Appendix, Table 2 shows the market cost 
of capital was greater,�han AFUDC rate after 1973, and significantly 
greater in 1974, 1975, and from 1978 to 1980. Hence, it will not be 
surprising to find our results are sensitive to the measure of the 
cost of capital. 
First, we test the null hypothesis: z � r, i, e, , whether the 
financial constraint is binding. Let w = z - c and ww z - a, The 
alternative hypothesis becomes 0 ) w or ww. Given our allowed rate of 
return data are confined to observations on regulatory jurisdictions, 
we average z, c, and a for each state. We calculate t-statistics for 
paired observations assuming z, c, and a are approximately normal. 
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Table 3 presents the sample means and test statistics, 3 The AFUDC rate 
is less than the realized rate for 1973-80 and 1982, and 
insignificantly greater in 1981. But we find the market measure of 
the cost of capital less than or equal to z from 1973 to 1978, and 
greater than z from 1979 to 1 982. This result has serious 
implications for the applicability of the Averch-Johnson model in the 
late 1 970s and early 1980s. 
Second, consider whether s � z, i. e. , if the allowed rate of 
return constraint was binding. Let u = s - z, See Table 4. Except 
for 1973, the realized rate was less than that allowed by regulators. 
It was significantly less after 1974. While firms were allowed to 
earn more than they did earn, other factors, such as AFUDC regulation, 
restricted returns.4 
Finally, we test whether s � r, or alternatively, whether 
s - r < 0, Let v = s - c and vv = s - a. See Table S, The allowed 
rate was always greater than the AFUDC rate. And between 1973 and 
1978, it was significantly greater than the market cost of capital. 
However, in 1979 and 1982 the allowed rate and the market cost of 
capital were almost equal, and in 1980 and 1981.the allowed rate was 
less than the cost of capital. If we use the market cost of capital, 
we can conclude regulators were not allowing sufficient returns in 
1 980 and 1981. 
s 
3. SUMMARY 
Different measures of the cost of capital yield different 
conclusions about the appropriateness of using the Averch-Johnson 
model to describe electric utility behavior in the latter part of the 
1970s. Tho realized rate of return was greater than the cost of 
capital given by the AFUDC rate for all years. However, when we use a 
market price of the cost of capital, the realized rate of return was 
less than the cost of capital from 1979 to 1982. This finding 
violates the financial constraint of the Averch-Johnson model, 
suggesting the model is an inappropriate description of electric 
utility behavior in the late 1 970s and early 1 980s, Also, we found 
the allowed rate of return was greater than the realized rate after 
1974. Using the realized rate as a proxy for the allowed rate will 
thus bias estimates of overcapitalization toward accepting the 
Averch-Johnson thesis. Instead of the traditional focus on allowed 
rate of return regulation, we suggest future research concentrate on 
practices that have restricted realized returns, such as the role of 
AFUDC regulation. 
APPENDIX: DATA 
We derived a market-based, weighted average cost of capital 
from the capital asset pricing model. Let 
c ' ( 1 - T ) ' ( 1 - EC ) + [rf + p ' ( rm - rf ) ] ' EC , 
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where i is the interest rate on debt, T is the corporate tax rate (set 
equal to 0. 50), EC is the equity to total capitalization ratio, rf is 
the risk-free rate of return, p is the covariance of the rate of 
return on firm equity with the rate of return on a market portfolio, 
divided by the variance of the return on the portfolio, and (rm - fr) 
is the expected difference between the market return and the risk-free 
rate. We determined interest rates by comparing bond ratings with 
average bond yields, Bond ratings for each firm between 1973 and 1975 
were from "Seouri ties Offered," MOQ!b:.'..!-Pyl!!!L!!!!!!!y_M!!UY!!!.a._!2.Zi!.:. 
z�. Ratings from 1976 to 1980 can be found in M22YY.'..!_gQ!R2!!!1£ 
g!£Y!!_B£RQ!1 (November 9, 1983). We compared these ratings to 
"Moody's Bond Yields by Rating Groups," Mo2gy.'..Lf!!l!!!L!!!!!!!Y_M!UY!!!.1. 
!���. The equity to capitalization ratios were found in U.S. DOE or 
U.S. FPC, "Capitalization Ratio of Common Equity," fil!!!!!!!J!!_Q! 
e!!Y!1£!y_Q!B£Y_!!!!!!1!£!• We assumed the risk-free rate to be equal 
to the rate on three-month U.S. Treasury securities, See E.!!2U2ID!.!! 
B£R2!!_Q!_!b£_e!£!!Y£B1 (1985), p. 310, Calculated betas are 
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available in Y!!!Y£-�!U£_!UY£!1ID£U!_�Y!Y£Y.a. The expected difference on 
a market portfolio and the risk-free rate was taken from Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield (1977), We assumed the expected premium to 1976 holds 
after 1976. 
In regulating electric utility investment the Federal Power 
Commission (1977) . defined the Allowance for Funds Used During 
Construction (AFUDC) rate as a weighted cost of debt and equity, 
Following this measure of the cost of capital, let 
a i • ( 1 - T ) • ( 1 - EC ) + e ' EC , 
where i, T, and EC are defined above, and e is an average of the 
realized rates on common equity in the periods t, t-1, and t-2. 
(Although the FPC suggested averaging the three previous periods, we 
use t, t-1, and t-2 to compensate for the slight downward bias of not 
including preferred equity and short-term debt, ) The rates of return 
on oommo,n equity were taken from U, S. DOE or U, S. FPC, "Selected 
Financial Ratios," St!1!!1!.!!L2Le!!Y!!1£!y_Q!U£4_!!1!!!1!£!· 
Realized rates of return on the rate base are available in 
U.S. DOE, "Selected Financial Ratios," fil!!1!!1!.!! _QLedY!!!£!y_Q!U£Y 
!!!!!!!!£!• They equal electric utility operating income divided by 
the rate base. The rate base equals net plant plus an allowance for 
working capital. We aggregated across utilities in each state, while 
making some modifications. Utilities with extremely high or low 
equity to total capitalization (EC) ratios tend to report realized 
rates of return that deviate greatly from the state norm, Thus, we 
excluded nineteen utilities with EC ratios greater than 90% or less 
than 10%, See Eastman (1985), p, 16, for a list of these. 
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The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
(NARUC) publish rates of return allowed by state commissions in their 
annual report (1973-82): "Section F: Basis of Rate of Return." This 
source was supplemented by U. S. FPC (1973), Several adjustments were 
required. We assumed the rate was in effect from the first day of the 
month of the date given and remained effective until a different rate 
�as reported. In certain years some regulatory agencies did not 
furnish the allowed rate of return to NARUC, For missing values, we 
substituted a regional average, based on the ten federal regions as 
defined by the DOE, At times more than one rate was reported, Where 
a range was given, we averaged the reported values, The procedure 
presented no problems where the specified range was small (less than 
0.5%). This was true for every state except Kansas from 1974 to 1978.
There, the highest value of the allowed rate was most consistent with 
the values reported for 1979 to 1982. We made no attempt to 
distinguish between electric utilities and electric/gas combination 
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firms. We calculated the geometric mean across months for a yearly 
average, We report the allowed rate of return in Table 6. Values for 
other variables are available from the authors, 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
•Regimes 
Group 3: 
TABLE 1: Possible Combinations of S, Z, and R 
Regimes violating z i r 
1)• r 
2) r 
3)• r 
4)• r 
5) s 
Regimes violating s 2 z 
4)• r 
6)• z 
7)• z 
( 8) ' z 
( 9) z 
also violating s l r 
Regimes not violating 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
s 
s 
any 
z 
s z 
z 
z 
r z 
z 
r 
r 
r s 
s r 
assumptions 
z r 
z r 
z r 
z r 
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uu73 
un74 
uu75 
uu76 
uu77 
uu78 
uu79 
uu80 
uu81 
uu82 
1173 
1174 
1175 
w76 
1177 
1178 
1179 
w80 
1181. 
1182 
TABLE 3: 
Sample 
Mean 
1.53 
0.01 
0. 93· 
1.57 
1. 61 
0.86 
-0.60 
-1. 5 9  
- 3  , 03 
-0.57 
TABLE 2: UU = A - C 
Sample Size = 42 
Sample 
Mean 
0.31 
-0. 73 
-0.22 
-0.08 
-0.12 
-o. 78 
-1. 73 
-2.22 
-2.77 
-1.43 
w = z - c AND WW 
Sample Size = 42 
t 
Statistic 
9.49 .. 111173 
0.03· 111174 
5.42 .. 111175 
10.80•• ww76 
11,07 .. 111177 
4. 43 .. 111178 
-2.78 .. 111179 
-8,52 .. 111180 
-13.8 9  .. 111181. 
-2.38 .. 111182 
Z - A 
Statistic 
2. 66 .. 
-7 . 22 .. 
-2 . 45 .. 
-0.90 
-1 ,34 
-8. 49 .. 
-17 .21'• 
-21. 94 .. 
-28.49 .. 
-13 .25 .. 
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Sample t 
Mean Statistic 
1.21 10. 97 .. 
0.73 4.28 .. 
1.14 8.2H• 
1.65 12. 7 9  .. 
1. 73 13 . 25 .. 
1. 64 9.88 .. 
1.12 6.11 .. 
0.64 3.88 .. 
-0.26 -1 . 35 
0.86 3. 90 .. 
• Significant at 5,,(lO<rol level for a one (two)-tailed test. 
••Significant at 2,5, (5') level for a one (two)-tailed test. 
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TABLE 4: u = s - z 
Sample Size = SO 
Sample 
Mean Sta tistio 
u73 -0 .16 -1.02 
u74 0.24 1.35 
u75 0.24 1.68• 
u76 0.21' 1.69• 
u77 0.54 3.34 .. 
u78 0.34 1,90• 
u79 0.79 4.10 .. 
u80 0.94 4.51 .. 
u81 1,43 6.88 .. 
u82 0.70 3.02•• 
TABLE 5: v = s - c AND vv = S - A 
Sample Size = 42 
Sample Sample 
Mean Statistic Mean Statistic 
v73 1.38 12.97•• vv73 1.07 6.70 .. 
v74 0.36 3.05 .. vv74 1.08 7.48 .. 
v75 1.09 8.46 .. vv75 1.30 8.89 .. 
v76 1.66 12.68 .. vv76 1.74 12.19 .. 
v77 1.95 13185 .. vv77 2.07 13.34 .. 
v78 1.18 8.32•• vv78 1.96 13 .21 .. 
v79 0.12 0.83 vv79 1.84 12.23 .. 
v80 -0.76 -4.20 .. vv80 1.47 8.09 .. 
v81. -1. 77 -10.56 .. vv81. 1.01 5.97 .. 
v82 -0.04 -0.22 vv82 1.39 6.76 .. 
• Significant at 5% (10%) level for a one (two)-tailed test,
••Significant at 2,5% (5%) level for a one (two)-tailed test.
AL 
AK 
AZ 
AR 
CA 
co 
CT 
DE 
DC 
FL 
GA 
H I  
I D  
IL 
IN 
IA 
KS 
KY 
LA 
ME 
MD 
MA 
MI 
MN 
MS 
13 
TABLE 6: ALLOWED RATES OF RETURN 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
7.92 8,08 8,59 7�59 7,33 7 .33' 8.01 9 ,33' 9.97 10.59 
9.24 9.24 6. 77' 12.16 12.16 7.76 6,90 7.42 13.36 13.36 
6.75 6.75 7 ,03 I 8.43 8 .49 8.32 8,32 8,74 9.03 9.28 
7.78 8,08 8.15 8.81. 9.40 9 .31' 9.00. 9.00 10.00 10.51 
8.00. 8,20. 8.20 8.25 8.86 9.51 9.65 10.22 10.38 12.20 
7 .46 7.83 8.67· 8.85 8.83 8.88 9.16 9.90 10.24 10.75 
8 .01. 8,01. 8.13 8.3Q 8.52 9 .21' 9.55 9,82 10.56 12.16 
7.86 8.37' .8.67' 8.72 9,03 I 9.03 9.23 9,83 10.28 11.19 
7.22 8.50. 8,50. 8.55 9.06 9,06 9.06 9.27 9 .44. 10.14 
7,93, 7.93• 8. 77' 8 .35 8.04 8.13 8,33 9.16 9.59 10 .44 
7.95 8.18 9.49 9.68 9.57 9.36 9.40 9.89 10.00 11.21. 
8.25 8.25 8.25 9.21. 9 .46 9.74 10.33 10.29 10.25 11. 77 
6.90 6.90 8,40 8.23 8, 71 9.68 8,83 9.29 10. 72 11.19 
7.64 7.82 8,36 8,55 8.93 8.93 9.08 9 .30 8.50 8.62 
6.60 6.95 6.99· 1.11. 7.27 7.35 7 .35 7.35 7.40 7.5o 
7 .17 7.22 7.95 8.59 8.53 8.79 9.09 9.33 9.42 9 .42 
7.60 8.56 8,75 8.75 10.00 9.00 9.36 9.00 9.98 9.99 
7.92 8,08 8.59 8,52 8.47 8.81 9.03' 9,33 11.03 11.44 
8.29 8,49 8.22 8.13 9,06 9,1S 9.26 10.53 11.44 11. 78 
7 .71 7. 71 8,73 9.19 9.33 9.37 9 .48 9.80 10.78 10.78 
8,20. 8.20 8.90 8.92 9.11 9.11 9.11 9.45 9.55 10.84 
7.91. 7�91. 9,12 8.81. 8.81. 8.81 8.81 8.81 10.84 11.11 
7 .49 7.62 8,54 8.44 8.90 9.08 9.04 9.21. 9.28 9.31 
7.06 7.22 7 .77 7.82 8.36 9.00 9·,os 9,05 9.77 9.73 
8,45 8.43' 8,18 8,28 8.28 8.28 8.28 8,55 9,88 9.88 
1973 
MO 8 ,10. 
�IT 7 ,37•. 
NV 8,13 
NH 8,50. 
NJ 7. 85 
NM 7.99 
NY 8,05 
NC 7.82 
ND 6.97 
OH 6.49 
OK 8,14 
OR 8,05 
PA 7.25 
RI 7,25 
SC 7.45 
SD 7 ,37• 
TN 7.92 
TX 8,14 
UT 7 .90 
VT 8,25 
VA 8,80. 
WA 7, 70 
WV 7.86 
WI 7.06 
WY 7 ,15 
TABLE 2: ALLOWED RATES OF RETURN, continued 
1974 
8,10 
7;82 
9.14 
8,50 
8,26 
8. 74 
8,23 
7.78 
6.97 
6 . 49 
8,62 
8,80 
8,00 
7.25 
8,09 
7;82 
8,08 
8,62 
8.20. 
8,56 
8,80 
7.88. 
8 .37 
7.22 
8.27 
1975 
8 . 10 
8,36 
9.14 
9.70 
8. 71 
8, 74 
8,51 
7.93 
7.59 
7.20 
8.48 
8,80 
8,48 
9,35 
8.59 
8.36 
8,59 
8.48 
8,63. 
9. 68 
8.80 
8.77 
8.67 
7.77 
8.57 
1976 
8,10 
9.02 
9.36 
9,70 
9,09 
8.84 
9.35 
8, 71 
8.47 
7.20. 
8 ,48 
8,80 
8,66 
9.02 
8.52 
8.75 
8,52 
8,48 
10. 36 
9. 77'. 
8. 72 
8,91 
8,76 
7.82 
8.69 
1977 
9.04 
8. 36 
9,36 
9.70 
8,92 
9,90 
9,03. 
9 ,15 
8.58 
8,33. 
9.01. 
9.41 
8 ,81. 
8,39 
8.47 
8,77 
8.47 
7.73 
10.52 
9.77• 
9 ,03 l 
9 . 17 
9.15 
8,36 
8.83 
1978 
9. 11 
8,30 
9.86 
10,03 
9.27 
9,90 
9,22 
9,68 
8,70 
9,57 
9,02 
9,41 
8.79 
8,55 
8,66 
8,83 
9.08 
7. 73 
10,25 
. 9 .84 
9.03 l 
9.02 
9.15 
8. 78 
9.27 
1979 
9.11 
8.84 
9,81 
10.19 
8,83 
9.60 
9.44 
10.00 
8,70 
10.14 
9,33· 
10,53 
9.02 
8,90 
9. 37 
9,34 
10. 64 
9.46 
10.25 
10.60 
9.44 
9. 65 
9.52 
8.93 
9. 71 
1980 
9. 11. 
8.84 
9,92 
11,53 
9.30 
9,85 
13.61 
10,27 
8.79 
10.49 
9.85 
11,15 
10 .16 
9,60 
9.83 
9.88 
11,51 
10.04 
11.29 
10.80 
9,66 
11.39 
10,60 
11.13 
9. 71 
1981 
9.89 
9 . 10 
11. 16 
12.49 
9.86 
10.66 
10. 76 
10.97 
9.75 
11.07 
10,68 
12.27 
11.27 
9. 60 
10.51 
10.45 
12.28 
10.51 
11.81. 
10,80 
10.15 
11. 71 
11.00 
11.11 
10.00 
14 
1982 
11.19 
10. 71 
12.41 
14.26 
10,67 
11.36 
10. 12 
11.92 
10. 71 
11.56 
11.17 
12.80 
12 . 67 
11.14 
10.86 
10.60 
12.57 
12.00 
11,98 
10.80 
10. 75 
12.58 
11.57 
11.28 
10.57 
1. 
2. 
15 
FOOTNOTES 
Only Perrakis and Zer_binis (1981) used allowed rates of retnrn. 
Their data were gathered by the National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) and were published 
jointly by the NARUC, the FPC, and the FCC. See U. S. FPC (1973), 
The following studies used the realized rate of return as a proxy 
for the allowed rate: Nelson (1984), Nelson and Wohar (1983), 
Cowing (1982), Gollop and Karlson (1980), Cowing (1978), Peterson 
(1975), and Spann (1974). For others, see Rothwell (1985), Table 
2.1. pp. 53-55. 
Differences between the allowed and realized rates of return may 
result from (1) lags in reporting the allowed rate of return, or 
(2) problems in aggregating across different regulatory 
jurisdictions. We examined the relationship between allowed 
rates and regulatory characteristics, such as fair value and 
original cost accounting and the inclusion in the rate base of 
(1) construction work in progress, (2) the AFUDC account, (3) 
payments for land held for future use, (4) contributions in aid 
of construction, (5) research and development expenditures, (6) 
allowances for working capital, (7) accumulated tax deferrals, 
and (8) .pollution control equipment. None of these factors 
systematically explained differences across states in every year, 
16 
3. The lack of bond ratings on utilities in 8 states reduced the 
sample size to 42. Compare Table 3 with Table 4. These are 
Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska, Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. There is no commission 
regulation of electricity in Nebraska. Instead, the District of 
Columbia brings the sample size to SO. 
4. Averaging the realized rate over a three year period, as done in 
Spann (1974) and Gollop and Karlson (1980), gave similar results. 
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